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Chapter 287: Religious Accommodation for Employees 
David Vidal 
Code Sections Affected 
Government Code §§ 12926, 12940 (amended). 
AB 1964 (Yamada); 2012 STAT. Ch. 287. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In October 2011, a Sikh man settled a religious discrimination lawsuit he had 
brought against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation 
(CDCR) for $295,000.1 The plaintiff, Trilochan Oberoi, alleged that the CDCR 
denied him employment because he would not shave his religiously mandated 
beard.2 Oberoi successfully completed all requirements for employment except 
for a “respirator fit-test,” which required employees to be clean-shaven in order 
to wear emergency gas masks.3 A twenty-six year veteran of the Indian Navy, 
Oberoi had previously worn gas masks effectively by rolling up his beard.4 The 
CDCR, however, continued to deny Oberoi religious accommodation despite 
numerous requests and a 2008 State Personnel Board ruling that the CDCR 
should attempt to make accommodations.5 
Reports indicate that religious discrimination in the workplace is rising in the 
United States.6 Sikhs, Muslims, and Jews are particularly vulnerable due to 
obvious dress or grooming practices that identify their religion.7 Chapter 287 
amends the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) by requiring employers 
to accommodate a broad definition of religious dress and grooming practices 
 
1. Brian Sumers, Sikh Wins Settlement with Prisons over Beard, S.F. DAILY J., Oct. 27, 2011, at 4. 
2. Amended Complaint at 5–9, Oberoi v. Dep’t of Corrections and Rehabilitation, No. 34-2009-
00054595 (Sacramento Super. Ct., filed July 31, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
3. Id. at 5; see also SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18, 
2012) (describing the prison policy that employees should be clean shaven in order for the gas mask to have a 
tight seal around the mouth). 
4. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18, 2012). 
5. Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 5–7; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS 
OF AB 1964, at 6–7 (June 18, 2012); Sumers, supra note 1. 
6. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 5 (June 18, 2012) 
(reporting that in 2011, religious-based claims submitted to the Equal Opportunity Employment Commission 
rose over 9.5 percent). 
7. Id. at 6; see also Religious Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www. 
eeoc.gov/laws/types/religion.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(describing obvious dress and grooming practices to include “wearing particular head coverings or other 
religious dress (such as a Jewish yarmulke or a Muslim headscarf), or wearing certain hairstyles or facial hair 
(such as Rastafarian dreadlocks or Sikh uncut hair and beard)”). 
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without segregating employees.8 Chapter 287 also clarifies the California 
standard of reasonable accommodation under FEHA.9 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
California’s FEHA has a higher standard for religious accommodation in the 
workplace than the federal standard under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, but FEHA is also less explicit in its range of protection.10 This section 
discusses the similarities, differences, and confusion between the respective 
protection and religious practices under the two laws.11 
A.  Federal Religious Protection 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) protects employees from 
religious discrimination.12 Under Title VII, an employer must reasonably 
accommodate an employee’s religious practices unless such accommodation 
would be an undue hardship on the employer’s business.13 The United States 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) develops and enforces the 
“policies defining the nature of employment discrimination.”14 The EEOC 
includes religious dress and grooming practices among the religious practices an 
employer must reasonably accommodate unless it would be an undue hardship on 
the employer’s business.15 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted 
 
8. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940(p) (amended by Chapter 287); see also Jack Katzanek, Bill Protecting 
Religious Garb Passes Assembly, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (May 29, 2012, 4:22 PM), http://www.pe.com/business/ 
business-headlines/20120529-workplace-bill-protecting-religious-garb-passes-assembly.ece (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (noting that the bill “was supported by a broad collation of religious affiliations”); 
SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June 18, 2012) (noting that religious 
dress and grooming practice “shall be broadly construed” in the bill). 
9. Id. § 12940(l)(1) (amended by Chapter 287); see also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012) (describing the difference between the federal and 
state standards of religious accommodation). 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2006); GOV’T §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012). Compare ASSEMBLY 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 2012) (describing how the 
FEHA requirement is more protective than federal law), with id. at 3 (noting that FEHA has not recognized 
clothing and hairstyles as religious observance in the same way as the EEOC). 
11. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 
(Apr. 18, 2012) (identifying the Sikh Coalition’s argument for clarity in FEHA). 
12. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3–4 (June 18, 2012); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (defining “religion” as “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as 
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s or 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business”). 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3–4 
(June 18, 2012). 
14. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (June 18, 2012). 
15. Id. 
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“undue hardship” as anything more than de minimus costs to the employer, a 
relatively low standard.16 One federal court determined that the Supreme Court 
“strongly suggests that the undue hardship test is not a difficult threshold to 
pass.”17 The Third Circuit, for example, found that a headscarf worn by a female 
police officer as a part of her Muslim faith was an undue hardship to 
accommodate because it violated the dress code of the police department.18 In 
addition, the First Circuit held that non-economic costs such as harm to public 
image could also meet the de minimis standard of undue hardship.19 
The Sikh Coalition,20 an organization advocating for civil rights, also 
expresses concern over the federal interpretation of what constitutes a 
“reasonable accommodation.”21 Some federal courts interpret “reasonable 
accommodation” in a way that allows employers to segregate visibly religious 
employees.22 In particular, Birdi v. UAL Corp. held that placing the Sikh plaintiff 
away from the view of customers was a “reasonable accommodation.”23 
B. California Religious Protection 
California’s FEHA prohibits discrimination against religious creed.24 The 
definition of “religious creed” includes “all aspects of religious belief, 
observance, and practice,” but does not specifically include religious dress or 
grooming practices like the EEOC at the federal level.25 
 
16. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 
(Apr. 18, 2012); see also, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardinson, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977) (holding that 
additional costs to give an employee Saturday off for the religious Sabbath was an undue hardship on the 
employer). 
17. United States v. Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 890 (3d Cir. 1990). 
18. Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256, 261–62 (3d Cir. 2009); see also SENATE JUDICIARY 
COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (June 18, 2012) (discussing Webb). 
19. See Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 136 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that an 
employee’s facial jewelry contradicts the public image that Costco aims to cultivate). 
20. See Mission and History, SIKH COAL., http://www.sikhcoalition.org/about-us/mission-a-history (last 
visited Sept. 12, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the mission and history of the Sikh 
Coalition). 
21. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012). 
22. Id. 
23. Birdi v. UAL Corp., No. 99 C 5576, 2002 WL 471999 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2002) (holding that the 
employer made a reasonable accommodation by offering the plaintiff six alternative positions that did not 
involve face-to-face contact with customers after the plaintiff was terminated from his position for wearing a 
religiously mandated turban against the company uniform policy). The court declared that it was unreasonable 
for the plaintiff to require “face-to-face customer contact” as a reasonable accommodation because “Title VII 
does not require the employer to provide the accommodation that the employee desires; any reasonable 
accommodation is sufficient.” Id. at *1 (quoting EEOC v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 1997 WL 399635 (N.D. Ill. 
1997) (citing Aonsonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 68 (1986))). 
24. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012). 
25. See id. § 12926(p) (defining “religious creed” as “‘religion,’ ‘religious observance,’ ‘religious 
belief,’ and ‘creed’ include all aspects of religious belief, observance, and practice”); see also Religious 
Discrimination, supra note 7 (including types of religious dress and grooming practices in their definition). 
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Similar to the federal law, California’s FEHA also requires employers to 
“reasonably accommodate the religious belief or observance” unless it creates an 
“undue hardship on the conduct of the business of the employer.”26 Despite the 
language being similar to that in Title VII, the term “undue hardship” under 
FEHA has been interpreted using higher standards and involves consideration of 
several factors, including “significant difficulty or expense.”27 However, there is 
confusion over whether the FEHA definition of “undue hardship” or the federal 
de minimis standard of “undue hardship” applies in California.28 While the FEHA 
definition of “undue hardship” applies to religion, courts have centered the higher 
standard of “undue hardship” on persons with disabilities.29 Furthermore, 
California courts have referred to the federal interpretation rather than using the 
FEHA definition.30 Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, for example, referred to the 
de minimis standard in dicta, confusing it with the correct definition of “undue 
hardship” in California.31 
III. CHAPTER 287 
In California, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire, bar from 
training, or discriminate against persons on the basis of “religious creed.”32 
Chapter 287 clarifies the definition of “religious creed” to conform to the federal 
provisions by including a broad range of “religious dress and grooming 
practices.”33 Religious dress includes, but is not limited to, clothing, jewelry, or 
face coverings that are in observance of a religious creed.34 Religious grooming 
 
26. GOV’T § 12940(l); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June 
18, 2012). 
27. GOV’T § 12926(t).  
“Undue hardship” means an action requiring significant difficulty or expense, when considered in 
light of the following factors: (1) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed. (2) The overall 
financial resources of the facilities involved in the provision of the reasonable accommodations, the 
number of persons employed at the facility, and the effect on expenses and resources or the impact 
otherwise of these accommodations upon the operation of the facility. (3) The overall financial 
resources of the covered entity with respect to the number of employees, and the number, type, and 
location of its facilities. (4) The type of operations, including the composition, structure, and 
functions of the workforce of the entity. (5) The geographic separateness, administrative, or fiscal 
relationship of the facility or facilities. 
Id. 
28. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 
(Apr. 18, 2012). 
29. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
30. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 5 (June 18, 2012). 
31. 51 Cal. App. 4th 345, 371, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 747 (2d Dist. 1997); ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 (Apr. 18, 2012). 
32. GOV’T § 12940(a) (amended by Chapter 287). 
33. Id. § 12926(p) (amended by Chapter 287). 
34. Id. 
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practice includes “all forms of head, facial, and body hair that are part of the 
observance by an individual of his or her religious creed.”35 
Employers in California must accommodate religious observances unless the 
accommodation imposes an “undue hardship” on the business.36 Chapter 287 
explicitly defines “undue hardship” using the FEHA definition, eliminating 
erroneous application of the federal de minimus definition in religious 
discrimination cases.37 
Chapter 287 also clarifies that religious accommodation is unreasonable if it 
“requires segregation of the individual from other employees or the public.”38 
Furthermore, Chapter 287 does not require a religious accommodation if the 
accommodation is a violation of civil rights or discrimination laws.39 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Chapter 287 clarifies that, like the EEOC, California law broadly protects 
“religious dress practice.”40 It also clarifies when federal judicial interpretations 
of religious discrimination apply to California law.41 As a result, Chapter 287 
establishes that California law provides more religious protection in the 
workplace than federal law.42 
A.  The Need for Chapter 287 
At an April 2012 press conference, Assembly Member Mariko Yamada and 
members of the interfaith community announced the need to clarify FEHA.43 
According to Yamada, the need for change stems from evolving demographics 
that have led to increased religious discrimination cases across the country.44 One 
survey, for example, reported that twelve percent of Sikhs in San Francisco 
experienced employment discrimination based on their religion.45 In 2011, the 
EEOC reported an almost ten percent increase in employer religious 
 
35. Id. 
36. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 2 (June 18, 2012). 
37. GOV’T § 12940(l)(1) (amended by Chapter 287) (clarifying that the FEHA definition of undue 
hardship applies to religious protection); id. § 12926(t) (amended by Chapter 287). 
38. Id. § 12940(l)(2) (amended by Chapter 287). 
39. Id. § 12940(l)(3) (amended by Chapter 287). 
40. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 1–2 (June 18, 2012). 
41. Id. 
42. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
43. Robin Miller, Yamada Pushes for Religious Dress Protections, REPORTER (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://www.thereporter.com/faith/ci_20396255/yamada-pushes-religious-dress-protections (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
44. Id. 
45. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 6 (June 18, 2012). 
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discrimination cases in the United States.46 According to Yamada, five-hundred 
religious discrimination cases in 2011 involved California employers.47 
B.  California as Compared to Federal Religious Protection 
Chapter 287 clarifies that California provides more religious protection in the 
workplace than does federal law.48 Federal law requires an employer to show that 
accommodating an employee’s religious dress would be more than a de minimus 
hardship in order to be relieved from accommodation.49 Chapter 287 eliminates 
confusion between California and federal law by clarifying that FEHA requires 
employers to show a “significant effect.”50 The “significant effect” standard 
considers factors such as costs, resources, facilities, and the type of business.51 By 
using the higher significant effect standard, California employees are less likely 
to have to choose between their religious expression and their jobs.52 
In addition, Chapter 287 distinguishes itself from the federal interpretation of 
“reasonable accommodation” illustrated in Birdi because of arguments that the 
federal interpretation may allow for the “segregation of visibly religious 
employees.”53 Chapter 287 responds to Birdi by establishing that accommodation 
is not reasonable if it segregates the employee from the public.54 Explicitly 
prohibiting segregation is consistent with Title VII and prevents employees from 
having to choose between their religious attire and segregation.55 
 
46. Id. at 5. 
47. Miller, supra note 43. 
48. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 4 (Apr. 24, 
2012). 
49. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 
(Apr. 18, 2012). 
50. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(t) (amended by Chapter 287) (specifying that “undue hardship” 
means “significant difficulty or expense”). 
51. Id. 
52. Cf. Keith Blair, Better Disabled than Devout? Why Title VII Has Failed to Provide Adequate 
Accommodations Against Workplace Religious Discrimination, 63 ARK. L. REV. 515, 532, 556 (2010) (arguing 
that the Title VII standard should be more like the Americans with Disabilities Act standard, which requires a 
showing of “significant difficulty or expense,” because it would allow employees to “practice their faith without 
the threat of losing their jobs because of a conflict with employment requirements”). 
53. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012). 
54. GOV’T § 12940(l)(2) (amended by Chapter 287); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 7 (June 18, 2012). 
55. But see Dawinder Sidhu, Out of Sight, Out of Legal Recourse: Interpreting and Revising Title VII to 
Prohibit Workplace Segregation Based on Religion, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 103, 105–06 (2012) 
(arguing that the federal courts’ interpretation of undue hardship for purposes of religious accommodation under 
Title VII is “inconsistent with the law” and should not allow employers to segregate employees due to 
“religion-based appearance”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely 
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”). 
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C.  Anticipated Effect on Business 
Chapter 287, sponsored by the Sikh Coalition, faced no official opposition.56 
Assembly Member Tim Donnelly, however, voted against Chapter 287 because 
he believes it will cause an increased burden on employers and unnecessary 
lawsuits.57 Congress has echoed this concern through the Workplace Religious 
Freedom Act (WRFA), “an on-again off-again bill” that makes changes to Title 
VII similar to those made by Chapter 287.58 In 2010, for example, Michael 
Eastman of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce referred to the WRFA saying “[w]e 
are not in the habit of supporting bills that make it easier to sue our members.”59 
Rachel Linn, a spokeswoman for Assembly Member Yamada, however, believes 
that by clarifying the law, Chapter 287 could prevent lawsuits.60 This view also 
has support by members of the U.S. Congress.61 Supporters of the 2007 version of 
the WRFA claimed the Act would reduce litigation because the law will 
encourage “employers and employees to work out [accommodation] 
arrangements amicably.”62 
It is unclear whether Chapter 287 will increase the number of religious-based 
lawsuits in California.63 Similar statutes already passed in New Jersey, New 
York, and Oregon.64 EEOC statistics of religious-based charges in New Jersey, 
New York, and Oregon appear to be similar to all other states, but the specific 
effect of the statutes have not been studied.65 Two years after New York passed a 
 
56. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8–9 
(Apr. 18, 2012). 
57. Katzanek, supra note 8. 
58. See Lauren Bohn, Workplace Religious Freedom Bill Finds Revived Interest, HUFFINGTON POST 
(May 25, 2011), http://http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/03/workplace-religious-freed_n_561560.html 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the workplace religious freedom debate on Capitol Hill). 
59. Id. 
60. Katzanek, supra note 8. 
61. Workplace Religious Freedom Act, Some Questions and Answers, INST. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (Jan. 3, 
2007, 9:05 PM), http://advocacy.ou.org/2007/workplace-religious-freedom-act-some-questions-and-answers/ 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
62. See id. (describing that the WRFA is not expected to increase litigation because, before the law was 
a de minimis standard, “the law prodded employers and employees to work out these arrangements amicably”). 
63. See Eliot Spitzer, Defend the Civil Right to Freedom of Religion for America’s Workers, 
FORWARD.COM (June 25, 2004), http://forward.com/articles/5867/defend-the-civil-right-to-freedom-of-religion-
for/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that there was not increased litigation after New York 
passed a similar statute). 
64. See N.J. REV. STAT. § 10:5-12(q)(3) (West Supp. 2011) (stating that “undue hardship means an 
accommodation requiring unreasonable expense or difficulty”); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(2)(d)(iii) (McKinney 
Supp. 2012) (defining “undue burden” as “significant difficulty or expense”); OR. REV. STAT § 659A.033(4) 
(2011) (defining “undue hardship” as “significant difficulty or expense”). 
65. EEOC Charge Receipts by State (Includes U.S. Territories) and Basis for 2011, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/state_11.cfm (last visited Sept. 12, 
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 2011 EEOC data indicates that New York, New Jersey, and 
Oregon do not have a higher percentage of religious based EEOC charges than other states. Id. In New York, 
5.9 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking the tenth highest percentage of religious-based 
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bill similar to Chapter 287, Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General, stated 
that the legislation did not increase litigation and was not “burdensome on 
business.”66 Instead, Spitzer claimed, it “strikes the correct balance between 
accommodating individual liberty and the needs of businesses and the delivery of 
services.”67 On the other hand, even some supporters of the WRFA concede that 
raising the de minimis standard may “complicate things for employers.”68 
Supporters argue, however, that unknown or burdensome effects on employers 
do not outweigh the benefits of religious freedom in the workplace.69 Congress is 
likely to track the effects of Chapter 287 and analyze the costs and benefits in its 
continuing efforts to pass the WRFA.70 
V. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 287’s author intends the law to clarify and correct deficiencies in 
California’s FEHA.71 It distinguishes California’s interpretation of “undue 
hardship” from that under federal law and specifies that an employer must prove 
“significant effects” to be relieved from accommodating an employee.72 In 
addition, Chapter 287 clarifies that segregation is not a reasonable 
accommodation.73 FEHA is a part of California public policy to protect the right 
of all people to be employed without discrimination.74 Assembly Member Mariko 
Yamada, the bill author, wrote that Chapter 287 both “ensures equal employment 





charges. Id. In New Jersey, 4.8 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking nineteenth out of all 
states. Id. In Oregon, only 2.3 percent of EEOC charges filed are religious based—ranking forty-sixth out of all 
states. Id. 
66. Spitzer, supra note 63. 
67. Id. 
68. Bohn, supra note 58. 
69. See Blair, supra note 52, at 556 (“While the cost to employers would necessarily increase under the 
ADA model, that cost is outweighed by the benefits of employees being able to practice their faith without the 
threat of losing their jobs because of a conflict with employment requirements.”). 
70. See Bohn, supra note 58 (describing the workplace religious freedom debate on Capitol Hill). 
71. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3 (June 18, 2012). 
72. Id. 
73. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 8 
(Apr. 18, 2012). 
74. CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 12926, 12940 (West Supp. 2012). 
75. SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1964, at 3 (June 18, 2012). 
